URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AFRICA1
By C. R. FRANK, JR.
ONE of the characteristics of the less-developed economies of the world is a rapidly growing urban population and urban work force combined with with a much slower increase in employment opportunities in the largerscale urban establishments. The result has been either unemployment or under-employment in small-scale, often individual or family-run, establishments. This phenomenon has been noted in economies such as Puerto Rico and India with high population densities as well as in the relatively under-populated countries of Africa.2 Those countries which are industrializing rapidly seem to suffer from this phenomenon just as much, if not more, than those which are not industrializing quickly. 3 The growing mass of urban unemployed and under-employed is regarded by many as a great social evil and a prime source of human tragedy. 4 Others, including politicians in power, fear it as a source of political instability. The presence of large numbers of poverty-stricken and jobless people in the cities puts a great deal of pressure on governments, national and local, to increase current expenditures rapidly to provide civil service jobs for the unemployed. At the same time governments are faced with demands on their capital budgets to spend more for development purposes. In addition, increasing urban population creates demands for urban services: housing, sewerage, lighting, roads, police, and fire protection and the like. A large mass of unemployed or under-employed do not generate the output or tax revenues which are needed to provide these services. For these and other reasons, the political consensus in most developing countries is that the pressures of urban unemployment and under-employment have to be relieved.
How best can this be accomplished ? One might say the solution is through high rates of investment and rapid growth. The history of fastgrowing countries and their continued inability to cope with the problem of unemployment indicate that something else besides rapid growth is required for a solution. Many writers suggest that growth must occur by investing in relatively labour-intensive activities rather than those which are capital-intensive. The argument runs that not only will this result in more rapid growth because of the low opportunity cost of labour relative to capital, but will increase the rate of growth of employment for any given level of investment. Even in cases, however, when the labourintensive investment is less than optimal from the point of view of growth, it may be justified if a high enough priority is given to growth in employment and/or reduction in unemployment.
In this paper, we will attempt to show that for the typical African countryl neither high rates of growth in the modern urban sector nor an attempt to resort to labour-intensive techniques in that sector is likely to have much effect on the magnitude of the urban unemployment problem. The answer, if one exists, to the problem of urban unemployment must be sought through examination of urban-rural income differentials and the distribution of public goods and services to urban and rural areas.
A. Composition of the urban labour force
The urban labour force constitutes only a small fraction of the total working force of most African countries. In Nigeria, for example, one of the most urbanized of the African countries south of the Sahara, the urban population (in cities having a population greater than 20,000) is only about 13 per cent of the total population. In Uganda, one of the least urbanized African countries, only about 2-5 per cent of the total population lives in cities and towns of 2,000 or more people, although many of those who work in the towns of Uganda live outside the urban areas and commute by foot or bicycle.
The working force in the urban areas may be divided into two groups, those in the modern sector and those in the traditional sector. Since the line between the modern sector and the traditional sector is often hard to draw, this distinction is somewhat arbitrary. (We include government establishments in the modern sector.) Basically, the difference is one of scale of operations. Throughout urban Africa there are numerous very small-scale establishments often individually or family run. These include petty trading, individual craft activities (e.g. shoemaking, wood carving, furniture making) and very small-scale manufacturing and construction establishments (employing, say, less than ten people). Workers in the traditional sector typically use little capital, do not employ modern accounting and book-keeping methods, and receive little remuneration in the way of profits or wages. A great many of the employees in the traditional sector are unpaid apprentices or family labour. Many traditional sector workers are employed on a part-time or casual basis. Those employed part time or seasonally often maintain very close connections with the rural areas, either spending a good part of each year in the countryside or returning to the rural areas periodically every few years.
Those employed in the modern or large-scale sector are better paid and more productive because of a higher capital to labour ratio. Many of the modern establishments are run and/or owned by Europeans. They employ modern methods of accounting and generally keep better records than the traditional establishments.
Of that part of the total work force living in the cities, only a fraction is engaged in the modern sector. In Nigeria, for example, workers in the modern sector account for about one-half of the urban work force or a little over 5 per cent of the total labour force. The rest of the urban labour force is either engaged in the traditional, low-productivity sector or is completely unemployed.
B. Growth in the urban labour force in Africa
Few data are available on urban labour participation rates in Africa. Growth in the urban labour force must be inferred from urban population data. Table I gives the rates of growth for some major cities of Africa. These vary considerably from 1-7 per cent per annum (Addis-Ababa) to more than 15 per cent (Fort Lamy). While the data on which these figures are based are very inadequate, the mean annual growth (weighted by initial size) of 6.8 per cent can be regarded as fairly typical. These differ considerably from the estimated growth of total population in the African countries which usually range between 2 and 3 per cent per annum. This means, of course, that the urban labour force is a growing percentage of the total labour force.
C. Growth in demand for a modern urban labour force These very high rates of growth of the urban labour force have not been matched by correspondingly high rates of growth of the quantity of urban labour demanded by the modern larger scale establishments. Table II gives some representative rates of growth of total non-agricultural employment. Note that many of these rates of growth are negative. Furthermore, the growth in the Kenya, non-agricultural labour force would be considerably more negative were it not for the extraordinary jump in employment between 1963 and 1964. This discontinuity was most likely the result of a mild export boom in 1964 and, more importantly, the signing of the so-called Tripartite Agreement by government, private Omdurman  1948  210  1960  315  3-4  Luanda  1950  150  1960  220  3-9  Leopoldville  1946  110  1961  420  9-3  Elisabethville  1950  103  1961  190  5*7  Kumasi  1955  75  1960  190  20-4  LourencoMarques  1950  94  1961  184  6*3 SOURCE: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, New York, various issues, and William A. Hance, The Geography of Ml-odern Africa, New York, Columbia University Press, 1964, p. 54. employers, and the labour unions which called for employers to increase their employment by ten per cent and the unions to hold back on wage demands.
The low rates of growth in Table II The low rates of growth of employment in Table II are, on the whole, considerably below the rates of growth of urban population in Table I . Thus, only a small portion of the annual increment in the urban labour force is being absorbed by the modern urban sector. The residual (those either unemployed or engaged in the traditional sector) are an increasing proportion of the urban work force. It is difficult to say how many of those in the residual are either under-employed or unemployed, but it is unlikely that the demand for the goods and services from the traditional urban sector has been growing at anywhere near the rate needed fully to absorb the growth of the residual labour force. In Nigeria, the large supply of workers to the traditional sector has kept the real wage-rate in the sector either constant or falling while real wages in the modern sector have risen considerably. (See Kilby [19] .) The highly paid workers of the modern sector are becoming an increasingly smaller percentage of the urban work force while the wage differential seems to be widening.
D. Composition of labour demand
There are several striking aspects of the composition of labour demand in Africa. First, the role played by government is very large. Government non-agricultural employment as a percentage of total non-agricultural employment for selected countries is given in Table III . It ranges from 37-6 to 5241 per cent. Second, employment in trade, commerce, and miscellaneous services is the most important component of nonagricultural employment in most African countries, ranging from 45 to 65 per cent for those countries in Table IV . Finally, manufacturing and public utilities accounts for a relatively small portion of non-agricultural employment, roughly between 15 and 20 per cent (see Table IV ). These Government employment grows roughly at about the same rate as recurrent government expenditure less the rate of growth of the average wage or salary paid by government. Wages and salaries comprise a large proportion of this expenditure (typically 60 to 80 per cent) which tends to change very little through time for any given country. Government investment expenditure is a small fraction of the total government expenditure, and wages and salaries are a much smaller proportion than is the case with recurrent expenditure. In any case, much of the investment expenditure by African governments is in payments to private contractors and this does not affect government employment. Thus the growth in government employment opportunities is largely a function of the taxing and borrowing capabilities of African governments and their willingness to expand recurrent expenditures. It makes little sense to talk about greatly altering these relationships by the use of more labourintensive techniques when government recurrent services are largely the services of labour anyway.
Value added in commerce, trade, and miscellaneous services, while including some profits and depreciation, is largely composed of wages and salaries (explicitly or implicitly). Thus, as is the case with government, employment tends to grow roughly the same as value added (in money terms) with an adjustment for increased average employee remuneration, i.e. employment tends to grow about the same as real value added. Furthermore, the commerce, trade, and miscellaneous services industries may be viewed basically as intermediate goods industries whose output tends to grow in fixed proportion to the general level of economic activity. To conclude, with regard to trade, commerce, and other service industries, there is little scope for increasing labour intensity and the growth of employment in this industry above that dictated by the overall growth of the economy.
The scope for increased employment growth through more labour intensity therefore lies in other urban-based industries such as mining, manufacturing, transport, construction, and public utilities which, however, generally account for less than 50 per cent of the total modern, urban labour force.
E. The role of labour productivity
The growth of employment in these other urban-based industries is considerably reduced by growth in labour productivity which occurs independently of the choice of technique with regard to output expansion. This growth in productivity occurs for several reasons :1
(1) Increasing quality of the labour force, particularly through onthe-job training and increased experience in a factory environment; (2) Disembodied labour-saving technical change resulting from better management, organization, and work procedures; (3) An increase in the share of the market for those firms which have achieved higher labour productivity because of better management or better labour quality; (4) Economies of scale; (5) Increasing capacity utilization resulting in increased productivity of maintenance and administration personnel.2
Of course, productivity may decrease through time if the labour force is deteriorating, or management control of operations becomes lax, but the main direction of change in Africa has been toward substantial increases in labour productivity.
The first three of these factors tend to operate independently of increases in output or value added. Thus, there is a tendency for some gain in productivity even though output is falling, stagnant, or growing slowly. Productivity increases resulting from economies of large-scale operation and/or increased capacity utilization come into play as output growth increases. Increases in output which begin to put a strain on the existing capital stock capacity may, however, cause the growth in productivity to fall off for very high rates of growth of output. The curve ABEH in Fig. I shows the relationships between output growth, productivity growth, and growth in employment. 1 The vertical axis is the rate of growth of employment, and the horizontal axis is the rate of growth of output (value added). At zero rates of growth of output the growth in employment is negative and equal to minus the distance of OA. The rate of growth of output must be greater than OB in order for there to be any positive increase in employment at all.
The growth in productivity is approximately given by the distance between the 45 degree line OCG which emanates from the origin. For example, when the rate of growth of employment is zero, the rate of growth of productivity is equal to OA (the rate of decrease of employment). When the rate of growth of output is OB, the growth in productivity is approximately given by BC. If the growth in output is OF, the growth of productivity equals zero. Whenever the slope of the curve ABEH is equal to unity (at the point E in Fig. 1) , there is no change in the rate of growth of productivity. Below the point E, the rate of growth of productivity is increasing and above the point E, productivity growth decreases.
We place no great faith in the particular form of the curve ABEH shown in Fig. 1 other than the fact that (a) for most relevant rates of growth of output, it probably lies below the 45 degree line (on the average, at any relevant rate of growth of output there is a net increase in productivity) and (b) only for very high rates of growth of output would there be a tendency for productivity to decline, i.e. for a wide range in the growth of output, there is a tendency for the curve to have less than unitary slope.
In order to test the appropriateness of such a relationship among growth rates of output, employment, and productivity, -we have analysed data from mining activities in three countries and for two railway systems in Africa.
a. Mining in Nigeria
In Nigeria, the bulk of employment in mining relates to tin and coal. The gains in labour productivity in both these industries has been re- We regressed annual percentage change in employment on annual percentage increase in output for each of the above industries. In the case of East African Railways, we added a third variable, the ratio of the increase in capital expenditure to employment. The results are summarized in Table V . The constant term in each of these equations is the rate at which employment decreases in these industries when output is stagnant. We converted these to percentage increases in output required to prevent a drop in employment by setting Y = 0 and solving for X1. The results are presented in the last column of Table V. Studies of various manufacturing industries as well indicate very large increases in productivity. For example, a study by Azarias Baryaruha of three firms in Uganda, Nyanza Textiles, Uganda Breweries, and British-American Tobacco Company, revealed average annual increases in physical labour productivity of 12-2, 6 6, and 3-4 per cent respectively In a study of the sugar industry in East Africa, the present author concluded that productivity in sugar processing in Kenya increased 52 per cent between 1958 and 1962 or an average of more than 10 per cent per annum.2
These studies also indicate that the increases in productivity could not be attributed to the adoption of more capital intensive techniques of production but rather to some of the factors mentioned above. For example, the increase in the productivity of the tobacco firm studied by Baryaruha occurred a 10 per cent decline in production over the period. The productivity increases most likely were the result of more efficient operation and increases in worker skills. The increase in the productivity of sugarprocessing in Kenya was basically the result of higher rates of utilization and efficiency of the existing processing equipment.
F. The role of wage rates
One possible way of stimulating a growth in employment opportunities is a reduction of wage rates or perhaps, more appropriately, a reduction in the growth of wage rates. In particular, wage-rate reductions can have a very significant influence on the growth of employment opportunities generated by government activity. For example, suppose government recurrent expenditures are expected to increase 5 per cent from one year to the next. If the average government wage also increases by 5 per cent, the increase in employment will be nil. If government wage increases are held to only 2 per cent and there is no change in the revenue and expenditure picture, the increase in employment will be about 2-9 per cent. Alternatively, the funds freed by holding the wage increase down to 2 per cent may be used, not for increased employment out of the recurrent budget, but for additional government investment activity which will have both direct and indirect stimulative effects on employment opportunities.
Several remarks are appropriate here, however, with regard to the use of wage restraint as an employment-stimulating device.
First, many industrial enterprises in Africa are foreign-owned, largescale enterprises which use very capital intensive methods of production. Wage costs are small relative to value added and wage changes have very little effect on output decisions and the technology used.
Secondly, wage changes tend to have less effect on the labour-intensity of the already existing capacity than on the labour intensity of new investment. When new investment plans are made, the current wage structure can be taken into account by choosing the appropriate technology. Past investments may involve a given commitment to particular products and particular technologies, embodied, for example, in the type of equipment and plant layout used.
Thirdly, for those industries which are highly labour-intensive, such as trade and commerce, the effectiveness of wage restraint in stimulating employment depends on the price elasticity of demand for the services of these industries. If demand is inelastic, there will be little change in the employment opportunities.
Fourth, a reduction in wages at the lower scales may have an insignificant impact on employment opportunities if trained supervisors are relatively scarce. The hiring of additional unskilled workers even at very low wages may not be profitable if it is not possible to hire additional trained supervisors.
Fifth, a reduction in wages at the lower scales only may have an insignificant effect on government employment if there are large wage and salary differentials between skill levels. For example, in the 1959 Nigeria Report on Earnings and Employment Enquiry, 11-7 per cent of those employed by the Federal and Regional governments together were classified as either professional, technical, administrative, executive, or managerial. The cash earnings of these senior employees comprised 41'5 per cent of the total wage and salary bill. At the other end of the scale, general unskilled labour accounted for 36-6 per cent of employment but received only 13-9 per cent of total earnings. A 10 per cent reduction in the lower wage scales could result in approximately a 10 per cent increase in unskilled employment at the same level of expenditure. A 10 per cent reduction of salaries of skilled personnel, which would adversely affect considerably fewer individuals could result in an increase in unskilled employment of approximately 30 per cent.
Finally, and most important, an advocacy of wage restraint as an employment-stimulating device must take into account the social and institutional factors which accompany the wage determination process in Africa. In the modern urban sector, the central government usually sets the pace in one way or another. Unlike in the developed western countries, in some areas such as in East Africa, British Central Africa, and Ghana, minimum wage legislation essentially determines the whole wage scale. Minimum wages are periodically adjusted upwards usually as the result of recommendations of minimum wages advisory boards which are appointed every few years. The increase in the minimum wage is very effective in raising the whole wage scale since the wages of most unskilled workers are at or near the current minimum wage. Recent increments in the minimum wage in many African countries have been very substantial. In Uganda, for example, minimum wages in the urban areas were adjusted in 1959, in 1962, and 1964. The minimum wage was set at Shs. 75-4, Shs. 120*0 and Shs. 152*0, respectively, implying more than a doubling of the money wage in five years.1 The real minimum wage increased almost as much since there was little price inflation during those years.2 In Ghana, minimum wage legislation was introduced in 1960. The result was a sharp shift upwards in wage rates. In those countries where minimum wage legislation is not the major factor in setting wage rates, the government wage scales have a substantial impact on wage scales throughout the modern sector of the economy. Such is the case in Nigeria today and Ghana before 1960.1 There are two reasons why government scales set the pace for the rest of the modern sector. First, the preponderance of government as the largest single employer means that other employers set their scales at or near those of the government in order to hold their own labour force and to be in a competitive position to attract better quality workers at all levels. Secondly, the larger private employers, for political reasons, want to achieve and maintain a reputation as 'progressive employers'. In some instances, the private employers pay substantially above government rates for these reasons. 2 The central government often raises its wage scales in large and discrete jumps. In Nigeria, for example, the traditional mechanism for raising government wage scales is the appointment of a commission of inquiry into wages and conditions of employment every few years. The commission's recommendations are usually adopted without substantial change, resulting in a discrete jump in wage scales which is changed only slightly until the next commission of inquiry is appointed. The sharp increases in real wage rates brought about by changes in minimum wage legislation or changes in government wage scales, accompanied by increasing urban unemployment, indicate that the wage in the modern sector tends to be set institutionally and politically without great regard for achieving balance between the demand and supply of labour. An examination of available recent government documents which deal with the policy issue of wages confirms this fact. There are two main arguments used to justify the usual recommendation of a substantial increase in the wages paid to general unskilled labourers. The first is that a stable, modern, urban labour force requires that the lowest paid workers be able to maintain themselves and their families at a 'living wage' or what is necessary to provide a man and his family 'a minimum standard of health and decency'.' A good statement of this philosophy is contained in the Uganda Government's Report of the Minimum Wages Advisory Board, p. 5.
The wages of unskilled workers in Uganda, in common with many other developing countries, are so low in many cases that they live in a state of permanent poverty and are generally 'underfed, underhoused and underclothed'. We feel, therefore, that until such time as they achieve a minimum wage which will enable them to live as decent human beings equipped, at least, with the basic necessities of life we cannot allow our consideration for any increase to be determined solely by the socalled 'economic laws', even though this may be contrary to the economist's usual ideas of how wage levels should be determined. It is of paramount importance to the country's future stability and prosperity that we achieve, as rapidly as possible, a wage structure based on the needs of the family unit. The realisation of this objective should receive top priority and the full co-operation of both the Government and of the business community.
In practical terms, a minimum monthly wage of 240 shillings was deemed a living wage by the 1964 Uganda Minimum Wages Advisory Board which it felt ought to be achieved in a few years, implying a 58 per cent increase over and above their current recommendations.2 Since the concept of a living wage is ephemeral, to say the least, once a wage of 240 shillings a month is achieved, this will no doubt be regarded as inadequate.
The second argument most often used relates to the very substantial differences in pay scales between the various labour categories. In Nigeria, for example, a young university graduate entering the civil service typically has a starting salary of ?600 or ?700 per annum with more or less guaranteed raises up to a maximum level of ?1,400 or ?1,500 a year. If he is lucky enough to be promoted to the so-called super-scales, he can earn close to ?4,000 a year. A typical unskilled labourer will start at about ?100 per annum and, unless he is able to qualify as an artisan by further training, cannot hope to rise much above ?150 a year.
These large income disparities result in significant pressures and sentiment in favour of forcing a more equitable income distribution by raising the lower wage scales. The alternative policy of lowering the higher wage and salary scales has been attempted by Nkrumah and Nyerere with significant political repercussions. Few other African political leaders would probably attempt such a solution.
Granted that the African governments cannot set wage scales which are completely devoid of any considerations of demand and supply; nevertheless, within a very large range, they have the power and the apparent determination not to let 'economic forces' determine employee remuneration.
G. Policy measure to stimulate growth in modern sector employment
In general, attempts to solve the urban unemployment problem by stimulating the growth in the demand for employment are likely to meet with difficulties. Efforts by government to increase its employment opportunities are limited by government budgetary considerations and the need to strike a balance between recurrent and investment expenditures. Attempts to impose a more labour-intensive regime in the private sector would have limited impact because of the relatively small proportion of the labour force employed in those industries with a significant scope for choice of technique.1 In any case, a policy of more labour-intensive production in the modern private sector is difficult to implement. It requires either (a) direct government controls, (b) a system of taxes and subsidies to encourage the use of labour, or (c) a policy of wage restraint. The first two alternatives carry with them the danger that private investment may be discouraged and reduced in the process. The third alternative, wage restraint, involves some formidable social and political obstacles.
Perhaps the most discouraging argument against attempting to solve the urban unemployment problem by increasing employment opportunities is the tendency for supply and demand to interact2 in such a way that an increase in employment is accompanied by an increase in unemployment. At any given wage rate and at any given point in time, the number of entrants into the urban labour force is not only a function of the prevailing wage rate, rural-urban real income differentials, etc., but probably also a function of the assessment of individuals of the subjective probability of getting a job. Prior to entering the urban labour force, a prospective entrant's assessment of this probability is likely to be very crude but nevertheless proportionately related to the ratio of the current stock of unemployed to the current number of persons gainfully employed.
Once a person has entered the labour force, any decisions to withdraw later from the labour force depends on whether he is gainfully employed or not. If he is not employed, his decision to withdraw, like his decision to enter, depends both on the wage rate and on his subjective assessment of the probability of getting a job which will change through time as the amount of his information increases through experience. Furthermore, the average length of time a labour force participant goes without a job is dependent on the ratio of those unemployed to those employed. The longer the labour force participant remains without a job, the more likely he is to leave the labour force both because his assessed probability of getting a job decreases the longer he remains unsuccessful in becoming employed and because his financial and intangible assets decrease. By intangible assets, we refer to his ability to live off relatives, friends, and tribesmen during his period of seeking work.
Once a person becomes employed, the likelihood of his leaving the labour force is reduced.
If the quantity of labour demanded increases autonomously, in the first instance, the ratio of unemployed to those employed increases as the number of employed increases. The fall in this ratio induces: (a) a greater flow of entrants into the labour force because of the increase in the subjective probability of obtaining a job and (b) reduces the flow of withdrawals from the labour force because of the increase in subjective probabilities, because of the reduction in the length of time a participant goes without a job, and because those who become gainfully employed are less likely to leave the labour force.
Thus, the quantity of labour demanded and quantity supplied to the labour force are not independent. An increase in quantity demanded brings forth an increase in the quantity supplied through a reduction in the flow out of the labour force and an increase in the number of new entrants. If the increase in the quantity supplied is greater than the increase in the quantity demanded, the net result will be an increase in the number unemployed.' 1 In terms of a mathematical model, let w be the wage rate, Qd be the quantity of labour demanded and Q. be the quantity of labour supplied.
Then
Qd c fd(w; a5,
This analysis of interactions between supply and demand also indicates that the current rates of rural-urban migration may not be maintained for very long in the future. As the ratio of those not employed in the modern sector to those employed becomes very large, the subjective probability of obtaining a job will decrease. People are unlikely to continue to flock -to the cities at current rates if there are so few jobs available. In the meantime, the stock of unemployed and under-employed is building up very rapidly and may be quite large before some sort of equilibrium is reached. ' Up to this point we have been concerned only with the possibility of increasing labour demand in the modern urban sector to alleviate urban unemployment. Other, perhaps more encouraging, alternatives exist. The first is a policy of encouraging the growth of the small-scale, mainly indigenous, urban entrepreneur. The second approach is to focus on policies which operate on the supply of labour rather than solely the demand for labour.
H. Encouraging the small-scale producer
Perhaps the most successful way of raising the labour intensity of investment is to give every encouragement, or probably more important, avoid every discouragement to the growth of the traditional small-scale sector. The employment effect of investment in the small-scale sector is much greater than in the modern sector. Estimates by Peter Kilby2 and the National Manpower Board in Nigeria indicate that investment per worker in small-scale industry is about ?100 to ?200. In large-scale establishments, the average ratio is from ?2,000 to ?3,000 per worker.3 With regard to where a is an autonomous shift parameter. Equilibrium occurs when Qd = Qs but the existence of equilibrium is not assured unless, among other things, there is some upper bound on Qs, the total labour supply. For African countries, there is almost no effective upper bound on the numbers which can be supplied to the urban work force since it is such a small fraction of the total work force. A shift in demand (a change in a) results in the following change in quantity supplied if the wage rate is held constant: aQs -Qs as aQd ta Qd U0e ta where e = (Qs-Qd) /Qd is the unemployment ratio. The sign of afs/&e is negative for reasons discussed above. Thus the increase in demand at a given wage results in an even larger increase in supply if -Qs afs
With this kind of model, an increase in demand can actually lower the equilibrium wage even if the slopes of the demand and supply curve (fdf/lw and afsl/w) are negative and positive, respectively.
1 For an analysis of the long-run unemployment equilibrium using a model similar to the one outlined here see I. Reducing the supply of urban workers Perhaps the most crucial variable which operates on both demand and supply is the rural-urban real income differential. Urban wage restraint must not be viewed so much as a stimulus to demand as a retardant operating on the supply of workers to the urban areas, especially if accompanied by policies which might raise rural real incomes.
It would be foolish to suppose that the real wage in the modern urban sector could be lowered by reducing money wages. If money wages are held constant or restrained, however, inevitably inflation would take its toll and real wages would deteriorate or rise only very slowly. As we pointed out above, the growth in money wages in Africa has come about mainly as the result of recommendations of commissions of inquiry into civil service wages and minimum wage legislation.
Rural real incomes might be raised in several ways. The pattern of development in many African countries has been one in which rural incomes have provided much of the surplus which has been used to finance expansion of social overhead facilities and modern sector development in the urban areas. The mechanism for providing this transfer has been agricultural marketing board policies (see Helleiner [15] ), export taxes, and import duties on consumption goods. Direct income taxes on rural incomes and the channelling of savings through financial intermediaries has not been used to such a large extent. Two questions arise with regard to this policy. First, has the resulting reduction of peasant incomes been wise, given the rapid increase in real incomes of those employed in the modern sector? The transferring of the agricultural surplus probably has reduced peasant investment and contributed to the excessive draining off of workers to the city. Secondly, what has been the net impact on the rural sector of the investment financed through agricultural surpluses ? Investment in urban construction, manufacturing, public utilities, and urban social overheads has often had little positive impact on the rural sector, especially when manufacturing of import substitutes involves higher prices to the rural consumers because of increased tariffs and monopoly protection. Investment in roads, rail, air travel, and port facilities has to some extent facilitated the movement of goods and services to and from and within the rural sector. All too often, however, a large proportion of the investment in roads is for widening, improving, and paving the connections between main urban centres, and very little has been spent on agricultural and feeder roads. Most of the investment in air travel has been for improving the main international airports and purchasing aircraft for international service rather than for improving connections between rural centres.
More important, perhaps, than the bias of investment activity toward provision of services for the urban areas has been the bias of administrative and political effort towards satisfying the needs of urban areas. Improvement in the quality of rural life, say through increased activities of the departments and ministries concerned with rural community development, may not require so much increased investment in the rural areas as a redirection of thought, effort, and research towards that end and a political reform which gives rural interests a stronger voice in formulating government policy.
Finally, an approach based on limiting the growth of population might be possible.1 Such a policy combined with attempts to reduce the urbanrural income differential could significantly reduce the population pressures on the cities. A report prepared for the Government of Kenya by several eminent experts on population control was fairly optimistic on the possibilities for population control in that African country. The government's response to the report was quite favourable. Perhaps some preliminary investigations of large-scale attempts at population control elsewhere in Africa are in order. Population control, however, is a very controversial subject and the deleterious effects of rapid population growth on development goals would have to be amply demonstrated before government acceptance could be obtained.
To sum up, the key to the solution of the unemployment, part-time and under-employment problem in the cities is a reduction of urban-rural real income differentials. This can be accomplished not only by urban real wage restraint and an increasing agricultural real incomes from cash crops, but by a redistribution of the benefits of social welfare schemes and public consumption goods toward the rural areas. The equilibrium labour force at any time is determined by equating the marginal product of labour fL with its price pL: (2) fL= PL = fLz* eat
The change in (1) in (2) through time is determined by taking the total derivatives of both sides of these equations:
(1*) Y f LL *L+fK. * fsS (2*) 4YL+fLL*L *+fLKk* +fLS = PL where the dot over a variable represents change per unit of time, f, represents the first partial off with respect to the variable x and re represents the partial off, with respect to the variable y.
From (1*) and (2*) we may eliminate I* and solve for L*. We may rearrange (7) as follows: rate of growth of skilled labour =-yY: rate of growth of output y Equation (9) is represented in Fig. 1 assuming PL' rS, and ac are held constant at some fixed level. The effects of these variables will be to cause the intercept A in Fig. 1 to be negative if (a) wage rates rise (PL > 0); (b) if skilled labour grows (rS positive) and skilled labour growth is on balance substitutable for growth in unskilled employment ((fLs-fSfLK) is negative); and/or (c) labour-augmenting technical change ca is positive and fKfL < D .L. The slope of the curve in Fig. 1 is the coefficient of ry in equation (9) and depends on the particular type of production function postulated.
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